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Introduction
The intent of this paper is to present data from
fur trade records documenting the depletion of the
northern Alberta wood bison,1 or buffalo, as per-
ceived by fur traders prior to 1840 and to consider the
implications of these data for contemporary game
management strategies, especially involving Abo-
riginal harvesters. The paper briefly reviews differ-
ent analyses of the causes of historical game deple-
tions and outlines Raup's 1933 reconstruction of the
wood bison depletion. It then expands upon and
modifies Raup's analysis, using data from the pre-
1840 fur trade records of northern Alberta. Finally,
it discusses the implications of these data.
Studying Historical Game Depletions
The past decade has produced ample literature
on the debate over the rights of Aboriginal people to
make decisions about local wildlife management.
Reconstructions of historical game depletions have
played a role in this debate. In fact, one article by
Macpherson (1981) asserts that historical game de-
pletions are evidence that no Aboriginal system of
resource management could have existed. The expla-
nation provided for this conclusion has two compo-
nents. First, the general principle behind Hardin's
(1968) "tragedy of the commons" argues that com-
munally owned property is prone to be abused as
individual users attempt to maximize their own gain
without regard for the common good. Second, access
to more efficient technology through the fur trade is
identified as the critical factor that allowed Aborigi-
nal individuals to over-harvest. This interpretation of
the past is used to argue that a centralized approach to
wildlife management was and is the only effective
means of conserving the resource.
Fur trade historians (e.g., Brightman 1989;Krech
1981; Martin 1978; Ray 1978) have also analyzed
historical game depletions but have identified a much
broader range of relevant socio-economic factors,
including territorial shifts of Aboriginal groups, the
interrelationship between introduced diseases and
Aboriginal belief systems, and competition between
trading companies. The introduction of new technol-
ogy is not irrelevant, but it is linked with these other
factors in a network of complex causality. Indeed,
some feel that traditional Aboriginal technology would
have been sufficient to overhunt animal resources
(e.g., Bishop 1981; Martin 1978).
Such analyses also accept that Aboriginal moti-
vation differed greatly from the "profit motive" es-
sential to Hardin's thesis (Ray 1974, 1978). Debate
over the precise nature of the motivations of specific
groups has produced an extensive literature, particu-
larly on the relationship among Aboriginal beliefs,
hunting practices and conservation (e.g., Brightman
1989; Krech 1981; Martin 1978). This discussion is
constrained by our extremely limited knowledge of
aspects of Aboriginal life other than those directly
involved in the fur trade (Brown 1990).
Historical game depletions are also of interest
to common property resource management theory
and practice (Berkes et al. 1989; McCay and Acheson
1987; National Research Council 1986). This re-
search examines the conditions under which commu-
nally-based management, both past and present, of
renewable resources has either succeeded or failed.
Taking issue with the idea that only a central govern-
ment agency can effectively manage these resources,
this approach stresses the specification of type of
access to resources as critical to success or failure. In
fact, Hardin's (1968) thesis of the loss of the com-
mons has been challenged precisely on this point.
Essentially, Hardin's case study examined only one
kind of access, in which anyone could use the re-
sources and individual users were not subject to
communal regulation. Under such conditions re-
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sources might well be depleted. However, there are
case studies that attest to instances of effective and
efficient management of communally owned re-
sources by an identifiable community of users, where
access to the resource is secure from trespass (in
Berkes et al. 1989; McCay and Acheson 1987; Na-
tional Research Council 1986).
This connection between access to the resource
and resource depletion is reflected in many of the
findings of fur trade historians who have commented
on the intensity of demand for resources in the Cana-
dian interior (e.g., Brightman 1989; Spry 1983).
Periods of competition among trading companies
resulted in a tremendous drain. Companies brought
extra personnel into the contested areas, and some-
times competitors employed explicit scorched earth
policies (Hudson's Bay Company Archives [HBCA]
D.4/90 opp. p. 89). Some Aboriginal groups relo-
cated to different territories in pursuit of their own
economic and political goals. Bishop and Ray (1976)
have even suggested that the 1763-1821 period of
competition in the Canadian north so decimated game
and furbearer populations that it laid the basis for the
Aboriginal economic dependency of today.
These varying approaches to historical game
depletions present a strong contrast. Macpherson's
(1981) explanation ignores the trespass integral to the
European fur trade and instead depends on a bridging
concept of "new technology" to show why game
depletions are associated with the fur trade. This
explanation thrusts the responsibility for depletions
back on the local Aboriginal peoples. It implies that
indigenous conservationist values were either absent
or were "swamped" by the impact of the new technol-
ogy. As the following discussion will show, the
connections between norms and behavior are much
more complex. The behavior of the local fur traders
themselves presents a strong argument for the con-
nection between trespass and resource depletion.
Raup's (1933) Reconstruction of the Wood
Bison Depletion
With these contrasting perspectives on histori-
cal game depletions in mind, I turn to one reconstruc-
tion of the near-extinction of wood bison in northern
Alberta. In 1933, biologist Hugh Raup, published a
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major study on the bison of Wood Buffalo National
Park, including an interpretation of the decline in
bison numbers. This account has been cited and
briefly commented on by other biologists and wild-
life managers (e.g., Soper 1941; Payne 1983; Wood
Bison Recovery Team 1987) but not substantially
critiqued. It remains the seminal work in this particu-
lar literary tradition. Common to Raup's discussion
and to subsequent citations/commentaries is the fo-
cus on rifles and consequent overhunting as a causal
factor in the decline of wood bison. No instances are
adduced to support this interpretation: the idea merel y
recurs, undeveloped and vague. Associated with this
idea is the assertion that the demands of the fur trade
itself could not have been sufficient to motivate this
overhunting. Although there is no attempt in these
works to prove the point argued by Macpherson
(1981), that new technology was instrumental in
game depletions, the juxtaposition of ideas leaves the
way open for such an inference.
Raup's 1933 review of the bison decline en-
tailed a detailed and comprehensive discussion of the
accounts of people who were mainly transients; that
is, travellers and land and resource surveyors. These
accounts derived primarily, but not entirely, from the
second half of the 1800s and frequently were
secondhand reports from unspecified sources. Raup
drew conclusions about temporal and geographical
aspects of the decline as well as about causes.
Early reports from the late 1830s and early
1840s indicated some abundance of animals on the
Salt Plains to the west of Slave River and on the Birch
Mountains, as well as heavy mortality among bison
on the central and upper Peace River due to severe
winters with deep snows (Fig. 1). There was a gap in
the records used by Raup until the 1860-1870s, when
they reported the near-extinction of bison in the upper
Peace and Clearwater River regions. Raup conjec-
tured that the 1840s may have marked the very
beginning of the bison decline, with the most rapid
period of decline occurring after 1860 or 1870. Sub-
sequent discussions (Soper 1941; Payne 1985) ac-
cepted these dates.
Raup characterized the process of the decline as
involving a general reduction in numbers and elimi-
nation of the wood bison first in the periphery of their
distribution, until by 1890 there were only small
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Figure 1. Fur trade posts in the Peace-Athabasca region (After L.H. Thomas n.d.)
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scattered bands in isolated areas and the larger herd
on the west side of the Slave River. He argued that the
persistence of this latter herd, despite hunting pres-
sure, indicated that this area was the original center of
abundance of wood bison. Soper (1941: 362) dis-
puted this point, arguing that the bison were probably
preserved in this area by the absence of early agricul-
tural settlement.
As to the causes of the decline, Raup (1933: 20-
2l) cited two main possibilities: increased snowfall
and the introduction of the rifle and consequent
overhunting. To support the snowfall theory in which
he appears to be most interested, Raup made refer-
ence to stories documented by various travellers in
the late 1800s. The stories referred to specific in-
stances, some apparently as early as the 1820s, when
deep snows with or without a hard crust had occa-
sioned the deaths of many bison. Raup suggested that
the northern bison were already at their northern
environmental limit in this respect and that popula-
tion losses resulting from a series of winters with
deep snows could well have contributed to a decline.
While Raup posited overhunting consequent to the
introduction of the rifle, he did not examine this
factor in detail. However, he did claim that "no
systematic hide or meat hunts were ever made" in this
area. As this paper will demonstrate, his assumption
was erroneous.
Evidence from the Fur Trade Records: A New
Reconstruction of Wood Bison Depletion
Unfortunately, in 1933 Raup did not have ac-
cess to the region's fur trade records. These consist
of some North West Company (NWC) and especially
Hudson's Bay Company (HBC) documents, includ-
ing journals, accounts, correspondence, and district
reports. Produced by persons who were resident
rather than transient in the area, these materials pro-
vide information on the trade's impact on bison.
However, these individuals did not necessarily have
identical perceptions of the process of bison deple-
tion, and their interpretations must be read critically.
Observers used terms such as "numerous,"
"plentiful," "scarce" and "exhausted" to describe
bison populations. Their use of these terms was
colored by their experience and expectations, their
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needs for the production of bison meat or hides, or
perhaps by "public relations" needs, such as promot-
ing a particular image of game abundance. These
records are also limited by their lack of Aboriginal
perspectives and voices. They focus on trading post
activities, concerns and personnel. Despite the im-
portance of provisioning the past, game species were
secondary to fur-bearers in the written record. There
are no descriptions of bison management practices
nor bison hunting techniques.3 Thus, the following
discussion will not be able to provide a depiction of
specific bison conservation measures that the fur
trade rendered ineffective. It is possible only to
outline the traders' perceptions of the process and
causes of the depletion of the wood bison.
Provisioning the Post: Requirements and
Organization
It is beyond the scope of this paper to present a
quantitative analysis of the fur trade's consumption
of provisions in the Peace-Athabasca area. Indeed,
the records of the Peace River forts contain very little
quantitative information on harvests at all. However,
since this paper contends that the demand of the trade
for provisions has been underestimated in some re-
constructions of historical game depletions, it will
provide an outline of what these demands comprised.
More general discussions of the provisioning re-
quirements of the western fur trade can be found in
Ray (1974; 1984).
The provisioning requirements ofthe trade posts
can be roughly categorized into internal and external
purposes. Internally, provisions were required to
feed the personnel at the posts, including officers and
employees, their wives and children and dogs. Exter-
nally, provisions were required to feed the transport
brigades and to supply provisions to other areas.
The amount of meat expended in the feeding of
a trade post could be considerable. At Fort Chipewyan,
Factor James Keith noted in 1823 that the standard
daily food rations comprised four to five fish or eight
to ten pounds of meat for a man, half as much for a
woman or a dog and a quarter as much for a child
(HBCA B.39/a/22, Oct. 11, 1823). This standard
does not appear in any way unusual for the trade in the
early 1800s, and it is accepted here as broadly repre-
sentative as a rationing standard for the Peace-
Athabasca posts.
Since Fort Chipewyan was a "fish" post, meat
was served only about twice a week to the personnel
and not at all to the dogs, unless absolutely necessary.
In contrast, the "buffalo" posts of the upper and
central Peace fed their residents almost solely on
large game. The forts of the Peace River had planted
gardens since 1788 (Lamb 1970: 242), but these were
not always a dependable source of food.
The amount of provisions required internally by
the posts can be estimated by multiplying the ration-
ing standard by the number of people the trade sup-
ported. These numbers could fluctuate considerably.
One major factor in this fluctuation was whether a
monopoly or a competitive trade situation prevailed.
For example, there is a clear contrast in the number of
posts on the Peace River between the 1806 NWC
monopoly when the NWC operated four posts (J.
Wallace 1928: 74-75), and the 1804 competitive
period, when the NWC had five posts and the XY
Company, four posts (HBCA B.39/a/3, May 20,
1804). A second example is provided by the contrast
in the number of personnel at Lake Athabasca be-
tween the 1820 competitive period and the 1823
monopoly, following amalgamation. In 1820, each
company had its own post. The NWC post was
occupied by 76 men, 31 women, and 49 children. At
the HBC post, there were 50 men and an unknown
number of women and children. By 1823 there was
only one post, with 57 men, 24 women, and 37
children (HBCA DA/87, Report of Simpson to the
Committee, Aug. 10, 1824; see Rich 1938: 121).
The second aspect of provisioning was the need
to accumulate processed meats for the feeding of the
brigades and the supplying of other areas. This
processed meat consisted of pemmican, dried and
pounded meat, and bags of grease. In the early post-
merger period, the Peace River posts were usually
requested to furnish 100-120 bags of pemmican,
weighing 80-90 pounds each. Additional provisions
were requested for the support of the 1825 Franklin
Land Arctic Expedition and New Caledonia (e.g.,
HBCA B.39/b/3, June 12, 1825; HBCA B.39/b/2,
Mcintosh to Smith and Dease, Dec. 15, 1822). While
these figures may not appear to represent huge quanti-
ties, the posts had difficulty in meeting the require-
ments. Data on these requirements are absent for the
pre-merger period, but the larger brigades typical of
that period would have required more provisions.
The provisioning of the post with meat de-
pended not only on the supply of big game, but also
on the availability of people with the skills to harvest
big game and the commitment to do so for the post.
The Fort Chipewyan records show how this activity
was organized in the post-merger period. In the fall,
local individuals with a reputation as skilled hunters
would be hired and outfitted to hunt big game for the
fort for the October-March period. They were com-
monly referred to as Fort Hunters (e.g., HBCA B.391
a/23, Oct. 19, 1824). These individuals appear to
have been aided by members of their extended fam-
ily. As animals were killed, the carcasses were
cached and runners sent to inform the Fort. Fort
employees were then dispatched to haul the fresh
meat back to the post by dog sled. Other Native
people would occasionally bring in both processed
and fresh meat or ask that employees be sent to haul
cached carcasses to the fort. The fresh meat would be
used as needed. The processed meats would be used
for trips by the meat haulers and would be stored for
the spring brigade (e.g., HBCA B.39/a/22, April 13,
1923). It was a mark of dire necessity if post person-
nel had to be fed on seasoned provisions (e.g., HBCA
B.39/a/25, entries of late October 1826).
The winter hunting season generally came to an
end by mid-March. By this time the fort expected to
have sufficient supplies of fresh meat to survive the
difficult spring season and sufficient seasoned sup-
plies to provision the brigades. If necessary, fresh
meat was processed for brigade use (e.g., HBCA
B.39/a/24, April 12, 1826), Even if supplies were
inadequate, factors associated with the advancing
season meant that large game provisioning had to
slow down: trappers were returning to the fort area,
the increased hunting pressure made it more difficult
to harvest animals, the melting of ice and snow
impeded the transportation of the meat, the Fort
Hunters were eager to be off for the productive spring
waterfowl and muskrat hunt, and the animals them-
selves were in poorer condition April through June
(e.g., HBCA B.39/a/24, Mar. 31,1826; HBCA B.391
a/29,Mar.1O, 1833). OvertheApril-Juneperiod,the
fort supported itself with the northward migrating
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flocks of waterfowl and stored food (e.g.,HBCA
B.39/a/22, April 23, 1823).
The summer hunt lasted from July through
September. Fewer Fort Hunters were needed in the
summer than in the winter, as the summer establish-
ment of the fort was smaller. Most of the men and
some family members left with the brigades in May
or June. Game permitting, the Fort Hunters usually
hunted within a short distance of the Fort, providing
mainly fresh meat. Other local people, travelling
more widely, were encouraged to make good provi-
sion hunts, process the meat so that it would not spoil,
and bring these provisions back to the fort in August
and September (e.g., HBCA B.39/a/29, entries of
Sept. 1832). Unlike fresh kills, which were often
recorded in the post journal by species and poundage,
seasoned provisions were simply inventoried by
poundage, so we have little idea what proportion was
bison. These provisions were stored at the fort to feed
the brigades or the fort personnel during periods of
the winter when the harvest was unproductive.
In the pre-merger period, the relationship be-
tween local people and the fur trading companies,
particularly the newcomer HBC, was more tenuous.
For the HBC, gaining the confidence of local people
was a major hurdle. Local people were reluctant to
commit to or even to interact with a company whose
future was uncertain. Their rationale is well ex-
pressed in the case discussed by Halcro in the 1818-
1819 journal of Colville House (HBCA B.44/a/l,
Oct. 5, 1818). Halcro used liquor to try to bribe a
Beaver Indian into acting as Fort Hunter, but the man
refused. His argument was that it would be too risky
to link himself in this way with Colville House,
because if the HBC did not return the following year,
he would be at the mercy of a vengeful NWC. The
forced withdrawal of the HBC in 1803 and 1815 from
the Peace lent authenticity to the image of the Com-
pany as a "bird of passage" and was a powerful
weapon in the NWC's arsenal to bind the Native
people to them.
With no reliable access to local Fort Hunters,
the HBC developed other strategies to secure provi-
sions. In 1804, for instance, Peter Fidler at Notting-
ham House on Lake Athabasca could not convince
anyone to act as Fort Hunter, so he and his employees
lived on a few provisions traded by various Native
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individuals at a high rate of pay, in addition to the fish,
rabbits and partridges harvested directly by HBC
employees in the vicinity of the post (HBCA B.39/a/
4, various entries, Nov. and Dec., 1804). Thepractice
of sending post employees to winter with Native
groups provided food for those men, as well as
increased the possibility of provisions being made for
the post. By 1817, the HBC had built up a relation-
ship with "freemen," former NWC employees, and
was able to employ them as Fort Hunters (e.g., HBCA
B.391a/13, Decoigne to Jonas Bird, Dec. 6, 1817).
Documenting Wood Bison Decline in the Pre-1840
Trade Records
The pre-1840 records provide information about
bison depletion that can be grouped into the follow-
ing sequence. For the pre-1800 period, bison were
represented as abundant in certain areas and less
abundant elsewhere in northern Alberta. From 1800
to 1820, documentation is scarce, and the focus of the
records was on the fierce competition between rival
trading companies. Persistent references to bison
depletion were made for the period 1820-1830, but
there was disagreement as to whether this situation
was a localized or general problem. Finally, for the
period 1830 to 1840, it was evident to all that the
problem of game depletion generally and bison de-
pletion specifically was a widespread one in the
Peace-Athabasca area. Different causal factors were
debated.
Pre-1800: the "Buffalo Hunting Grounds"
In this earliest fur trade period, comments about
the regional distribution of bison and the use of bison
by the fur trade are most clearly provided by Ross,
Tumor and Fidler, the members of a HBC reconnais-
sance team which wintered at Lake Athabasca in
1791-92. The provisioning of future HBC posts and
brigades in the area was a major concern. Based on
information they received from NWC men, their
reports identified the central and upper Peace River
as the major buffalo hunting ground. The Beaver
Indians at the NWC post of Boyer River (Fig. 1)
supplied seasoned provisions, "Buffalo flesh both
fresh and cured such as beat meat and rendered fatt"
(Tyrrell 1934: 452). Ross commented that without
the provisions from Boyer River, the NWC would
never have been able to transport out their furs (HBCA
B.9/a/l, Aug. 29, 1791). In 1792, Tumor noted that
a canoe travelled between Boyer River and Lake
Athabasca, bringing down two tons of seasoned pro-
visions at a time (Tyrrell 1934: 452). Although most
of the NWC provisions appear to have been taken
from the Boyer River area, buffalo were recorded to
be just as abundant at the post above Boyer River,
located somewhere around the Whitemud River.
These comments on the abundance of game in the
Peace were supported and amplified in the same year
by Mackenzie who referred to "vast herds" of elk and
bison (Lamb 1970: 259).
Tumor identified the mixed prairie-woodland
of the Salt Plains on the west side of the Slave River
as a second buffalo hunting ground. He recom-
mended that any post on Lake Athabasca should
establish a provisioning post at the rapids on the
Slave River to procure and season buffalo meat
(Tyrrell 1934: 456). Mackenzie (Lamb 1970: 167-
168) and subsequent authors also described this area
as abounding in game, including bison, moose, bea-
ver and waterfowl.
A third area noted in these records as "famous
for Buffaloe and Red Deer" (Tyrrell 1934: 461) was
the Clearwater River and its confluence with the
Athabasca River. This area was heavily exploited,
because the brigades used this route to the Methye
Portage. Early provisioning posts of the Athabasca
District were located at the Forks of the Athabasca
and the Clearwater and further down the Athabasca
River (Tyrrell 1934: 460; Lamb 1970: 129). The
upper reaches of the Clearwater River were exploited
by hunters from the lIe a la Crosse district.
Notably absent from these early reports on
bison hunting grounds was the Peace-Athabasca Delta.
Today this delta is the home year-round for Wood
Buffalo National Park's largest bison herds. In the
early 1800s, however, it was evidently not consid-
ered a major bison hunting ground, although some
bison wintered in the delta near Lake Claire and were
used on occasion by the Lake Athabasca posts. For
instance, in the 1802-04 period of intensive competi-
tion in the Athabasca area, both the NWC and the XY
Company located winter provisioning posts there,
which relied mainly on bison (HBCA B.39/a/3, Sept.
23,1803; B.39/a/4, Sept. 25,1804). This intensity of
use does not necessarily derive from great abundance
of the resource. The failure of the XY Company to
establish a post on the Peace meant that provisions
had to be secured in the Lake Athabasca area. The
NWC post was established as part of a policy of
setting up posts wherever its competition did, in order
to choke off competing trade.
1800-1820: Competitive Stress in the Peace-
Athabasca region
Periods of intensified competition among trad-
ing companies characterize these two decades. From
1802 to 1804, both the XY Company and the HBC
made unsuccessful attempts to oppose the NWC in
the Peace, associated with a sharp increased in the
number of traders in the region. Not only were there
now XY Company and HBC employees, but the
NWC brought in additional personnel to meet the
challenge. Some of the new personnel were eastern
Aboriginal peoples, Iroquois and Ojibway. Some
Iroquois had arrived in the West as early as the 1790s,
either independently or under contract to the NWC
(Lamb 1970: 411; HBCA B.39/e/4). Many others
were brought out under contract to the NWC in the
1800-04 period (Nicks 1979). In 1804, there were
apparently 110 Iroquois in the upper Peace region
alone. This group provided about a quarter of the
NWC's returns for the entire Peace-Athabasca dis-
trict and over half of the XY Company's returns for
the district (HBCA B.39/a/3, May 20, 1804). After
the main period of competition ended in 1804 with
the merger of the NWC and XY Company, many of
the Iroquois returned east, but a substantial group
remained and settled in the West, as did other former
employees or "freemen." It was among the "free-
men" that the fur traders found their skilled and
committed workers.
In 1815 the HBC made another, even more
disastrous, bid for the Peace. Again, starvation was
the result, as the NWC cut the trading party off from
all provisions. In the second half of this decade, there
are a number of references to a marked decline in
beaver (Masson 1960: 109, 113) and a scarcity of
provisions on the Peace (HBCA B.39/a/13, Dec. 9,
1817). Both Wentzel (Masson 1960: 109)and Harmon
(1920: 193) attributed much of the decline in beaver
to the hunting practices of the Iroquois. Perhaps the
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scarcity of provisions was due to the same cause.
Harmon (1920: 193) commented on the Iroquois
attitude towards resources:
As they are mere rovers, they do not feel the same
interest, as those who permanently reside here, in
keeping the stock of animals good, and therefore
they make great havock among the game, destroy-
ing alike the animals which are young & old.
In 1817 the HBC made its third and eventually
successful move into the Peace. Ironically for the
NWC, this time the HBC was able to secure provi-
sions successfully by employing Iroquois freemen
from the Lac la Biche area. Decoigne, the HBC
Factor at Lake Athabasca and a former "Norwester,"
was quite explicit about this strategy. He intended to
employ "Cardinall and Glaudus [sic] with all the
Iroqouius [sic]" (HBCA B.39/a/13, Decoigne to
Lewis, Dec. 6, 1817) in making provisions at the
forks of the Athabasca and Clearwater for the HBC
brigade. He further recommended that freemen be
hired as Fort Hunters and interpreters "Particularly
till such time as we acquire a footing among the
Indians" (HBCA B.39/a/13, Decoigne to Bird, Dec.
6, 1817).
As a result, both the Colville House and Fort St.
Mary contingents of the HBC brought Iroquois em-
ployees with them to harvest game and to act as
liaison in procuring provisions from the local Beaver
Indian population. Fort St. Mary also relied on both
an Iroquois group already resident in the Smoky
River area and a French-Cree freeman, Baptiste
Bisson. Hiring Bisson as Fort Hunter and interpreter
was seen as a coup because he was "the best without
exception in the North" (Rich 1938: 64), as well as
connected by marriage with a Saulteaux family which
had a good reputation as fur hunters. Even after the
HBC posts were relatively well-established on the
Peace, Simpson stressed the advantages of hiring
freemen, "as we depend on them in a great measure
for provisions" (Rich 1938: 278).
While we can only speculate on the quantitative
impact of these years of fur trade competition on
bison numbers, the condition necessary for a "trag-
edy ofthe commons" is evident: an influx of outsid-
ers interested in local resources. There is evidence
that the immigrant specialist hunters and trappers
over-exploited the beaver resource. As their activi-
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ties were also considered vital for the provisions
trade, declines in bison, the major provisioning spe-
cies, are equally likely. Indeed, this is supported by
the records for the following decade.
1821-1830 Varying Perceptions of the Bison Decline
With the establishment of the HBC monopoly
in 1821 comes the most extensive documentation of
conditions in the Peace-Athabasca region and the
earliest clear evidence of the decline of bison in the
central and upper Peace. Before turning to the Peace
River material, some comments are due on the other
buffalo hunting grounds.
As mentioned previously, the Peace-Athabasca
Delta area was not considered to be a major hunting
ground, but its proximity to the Lake Athabasca forts
did mean that its small bison population was ex-
ploited from time to time. Although there is no overt
reference to bison diminishing in the delta, bison
were no longer harvested there after the late 1820s.
Instead, Fort Chipewyan journal references to bison
harvests locate them on the north shore of the Peace
River or, more rarely, up the Athabasca River. One
period of heavy exploitation is well-documented,
which may have been instrumental in the bison de-
cline. After an unsuccessful autumn hunt in 1820,
Simpson directed the Fort Wedderburne Fort Hunters
to Lake Clair, "where there are generally a number of
Buffaloe at this season of the year" (Rich 1938: 182,
Dec. 5, 1820). In February, the lake fisheries failed,
and buffalo meat became the mainstay of the HBC
post, Fort Wedderburne. Apparently, most of this
meat was harvested around Lake Clair. The NWC
post, Fort Chipewyan, was undoubtedly also affected
by the failure of the fisheries. Its harvest of large
game over that winter was estimated by Brown of the
HBC at 300 animals (HBCA B.39/e/3). If many of
these were bison from the Lake Clair herds, it is not
surprising that references to bison harvests in the
delta diminish in subsequent years.
The buffalo hunting ground on the west side of
the Slave River seems to have been preserved from
this kind of overhunting, probably due to factors of
location and access to labor. This hunting ground
was abutted by trade posts which were located on
good fishing lakes. The forts' requirements for game
were accordingly lower. Also, this area was far
enough from either post that only its margins were
easily accessed by the Fort Hunters. To overcome
this, a provisioning post could have been established
in the area, as Tumor suggested in 1792, but the
Chipewyan occupants were at that time notoriously
reluctant to part with their provisions (Tyrrell 1934:
414; Gillespie 1975).
Data on bison in the Clearwater- Athabasca forks
area are scanty. In 1820, Simpson's Athabasca Re-
port (Rich 1938) predictably characterized the area as
abounding in bison and deer. The subsequent with-
drawal of a regular post there as part of his post-
merger austerity program resulted in few references
to the game situation in the 1820-1830s. Existing
reports are contradictory (W.S. Wallace 1968: 136),
so this area will not be discussed further.
As noted above, the records from the Peace
River provide the clearest evidence of the bison
decline. Yet, even in these records, different percep-
tions of this decline existed. The Peace River Chief
Traders, William MacIntosh of Fort Dunvegan and
Colin Campbell of Fort Vermilion stressed that the
upper and central Peace were depleted of game from
the very first of the post-merger records of 1822. The
Fort Vermilion District Report for 1822 noted, for
instance, "the exausted [sic] state of the country in
large animals" (HBCA B.224/e/l), and Fort Dunvegan
was characterized as "formerly a plentiful place ....
Buffalo has been very scarce their [sic] some years
past" (HBCA B.39/e/4, fo. 7d).
MacIntosh and Campbell continued to corre-
spond with the Chief Factors of the District about this
problem throughout the 1820s and into the 1830s
(HBCA B.39/b/2 to B.39/b/5). These two Chief
Traders were former NWC traders and had both lived
in the Peace for some years, MacIntosh since about
1805 and Campbell since 1811 (W.S. Wallace 1934:
431,473). Their comments on game depletion ap-
pear to have been made in comparison to the harvests
of earlier years. Their remarks suggested a regional,
not just a local, depletion.
At least one of their superiors agreed with them.
Edward Smith, Chief Factor at Fort Chipewyan, was
vehement in his analysis of the problem of game
decline:
Witness, Hay River and Fort Vennilion; had never
Iroquois been introduced you would have still
handsome Returns from these Places. Now they
are dwindled away to nothing. The Poor Beaver
Indians with all their industry scrape only a miser-
able livelyhood -, their Country exausted of Bea-
ver and large Animals, and by who? - by the
Wild, ambitious policy of the Whites Who study
their own interest first and then that of the Natives
[HBCA B.39/b/2; Smith to MacIntosh, May 1823].
A different view of the game situation in the
Peace was presented by George Simpson in 1820
(Rich 1938). Simpson characterized the two HBC
posts there as having suffered in past winters from
starvation due to local depletion, despite being situ-
ated in the midst of general or regional abundance.
Perhaps he considered this local depletion through
overhunting inevitable, because he emphasized that
the real problem was the lack of transportation, rec-
ommending that horses be imported to provide the
necessary access to the more distant hunting grounds.
Similarly, when Fort Vermilion experienced a
crisis in provisioning in the winter of 1822-23,
Simpson disagreed with Factor Campbell's sugges-
tion that the post be moved nearer to the Caribou
Mountain fishery. He counter-proposed that an out-
post should be provided to the Hay River Chipewyans,
presumably to encourage and facilitate the provisions
trade (HBCA B.39/b/2, Simpson to Smith, Feb. 8,
1823). Again, this solution depended on an abun-
dance of game elsewhere in the region and focused on
how to gain access to it.
In fact, Simpson's sole reference to conserva-
tion of game in the Peace River region in this decade
emerged as a post hoc evaluation of the 1826-28
closure of Fort Dunvegan. Simpson noted that game
was recovering in the Dunvegan area and surmised
that once Dunvegan re-opened and the Beaver Indi-
ans of the upper Peace returned from the Fort Vermil-
ion area, Fort Vermilion's resources would recover
as well (HBCA D.4/90, Simpson's Report to the
Governor and Committee, York Factory, July 25,
1827).
In summary, beginning in the early 1820s, ob-
servations about a regional bison decline were made
by the Factors of the Peace River posts. Given their
long experience in the area, their arguments have, to
my mind, great credibility. Simpson seriously under-
rated the threat to game and specifically to bison
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populations in the region. By viewing depletion as a
localized phenomenon, he deferred, and on one occa-
sion, stifled the development of alternate strategies
for provisioning. While Simpson commented on the
value of conservation strategies for dealing with
localized depletion in the case of Fort Vermilion
(1826-28), his regional policies to address other is-
sues had variable impacts on the provisioning issue.
The reduction of personnel and posts had the benefi-
cial impact of reducing the demand on food re-
sources. On the other hand, once the summer beaver
hunt was banned to conserve beaver, Aboriginal
people were doubly encouraged to make provisions
during the summer (HBCA D.4/87, Report of Simpson
to the Governor and Committee, Aug. 10, 1824).
Essentially, it appears that the many other issues that
the HBC faced after the 1821 merger - furbearer
populations, expenditures, and trader-aboriginal re-
lations - took precedence. As long as provisions were
forthcoming from the Peace, the problem of game
decline assumed a low priority.
1830-1840: Consensus on Decline of Bison;
Discussion of the Causes
Simpson's optimism continued until at least
1829 (HBCA D.4/93, letter of Mar. 1, 1829), but by
1832, his opinion about the resources of the Peace
suffered a sharp reverse. Simpson now characterized
the entire Athabasca District as having been "over-
wrought during a series of violent oppositions but
even now does not recover as it should" (HBCA D.4/
99, Report to the Governor and Committee, Aug. 10,
1832, point 63). In response, John Charles, the Chief
Factor for the Peace-Athabasca District reported that
beaver populations had recovered (HBCA B.39/b/5,
Charles to Simpson, June 1, 1833), but the same
could not be said for big game. By this period, the
regional decline in game appears to have been gener-
ally acknowledged, even if not decisively addressed.
Nonetheless, the Peace River posts were still pres-
sured to supply provisions (HBCA B.39/b/11, Fisher
to Shaw, Sept. 2, 1840).
In 1833, MacIntosh of Fort Dunvegan and
Charles of Fort Chipewyan corresponded extensively
on this topic. MacIntosh emphasized the part played
in the decline of the harvest at Fort Dunvegan by the
loss of the area of the upper Smoky River to an
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Iroquois/freeman group. He described this area as
once highly prized and carefully conserved by the
Beaver Indians with respect to both fur-bearers and
game animals, "but the Cattle are now destroyed in
that Valuable portion of their Lands by the people on
whom it was bestowed" (HBCA B.39/b/5, MacIntosh
to Charles, Oct. 22, 1833).
In December 1833, Charles summarized the
situation for the Governor and Committee, presum-
ably on the basis of this correspondence:
Peace Riverin Respect of Large Animals, is not the
same Country it was in Days long Since gone by,
there is no Buffalo in that Quarter now, And the
Exertion of the Beaver Indians ...on their Circum-
scribed Grounds with the encouragement held out
by us for Provisions and Leather has I believe
thinned the Moose Deer considerably [HBCA B.391
b/5, Charles to Governor and Committee, Dec.
1833].
However, the last existing letter in this correspond-
ence between Charles and MacIntosh states the bot-
tom line:
Our Object however at present is to obtain all the
Provisions we can and however we may Wish to
preserve the Cattle in our own District... . We must
defer the Commencement of any Measure to this
Effect, till after Autumn, 34 When in all probabil-
ity some other Arrangement will be made Con-
nected with Supplying Caledonia [HBCA B.39/b1
5, Charles to MacIntosh, Dec. I, 1833].
As Charles reminded MacIntosh, Dunvegan was still
able to produce its quota of seasoned provisions for
the brigade and Caledonia.
The role of experience in channelling expecta-
tions is made quite clear in this correspondence.
Charles, a relative newcomer, viewed the current
harvest from Dunvegan as adequate for the current
trade demand and, to a certain extent, as advanta-
geous with respect to the supply from Fort Vermilion.
MacIntosh, the "old-timer," compared Dunvegan's
current supply unfavorably to Dunvegan's former
harvest, and he indicated that the game populations
were not equal to the current Aboriginal demand
(HBCAB.39/b/5, MacIntosh to Charles, Oct. 7,1833,
Oct. 22, 1833).
Outside groups continued to exert pressure on
the resources of the Peace in this period. In the late
1820s and the 1830s, the Fort Dunvegan area in
particular and the Fort Vennilion area to a lesser
degree experienced a series of incursions of Aborigi-
nal groups from the Saskatchewan District. In part,
these appear to have been motivated by the Peace's
continuing, if increasingly illusory, reputation for
resource abundance. The famine of the mid-1830s in
the Saskatchewan District was certainly also a moti-
vating factor at that time (HBCA B.56, Feb. 1, 1837).
Each of these incursions was viewed with great
distrust by the Beaver people, and each was followed
by assertions that the invading group had exhausted
resources, as documented below.
Correspondence from 1833 indicates that the
intrusion of the Fort Saskatchewan freemen was
probably a yearly event since the 1828 re-establish-
ment of Fort Dunvegan. The continuation of the
freeman group's "extenninating system of destroy-
ing whatsoever comes in the way at all seasons ofthe
year" was deplored (HBCA B.39/b/5, Charles to
MacIntosh, Feb. 28, 1833). References in the post
journals in 1829 specifically pinpoint the Fort
Assiniboine Iroquois as devastating the beaver (Pro-
vincial Archives of Alberta (PAA) 74.1 box 4, item
120, entries of Feb. 26 and Nov. 1, 1829). Subsequent
invading groups included the Assiniboine of Fort
Assiniboine in 1835 (HBCA B.56/a/4, Aug. 23, 1835);
the Plains Cree in 1836, who were accused of "having
exhausted the best part of the country for larger
animals" (HBCA B.56/a/5, Nov. 2, 1836); and in
1837 the Saskatchewan freemen from Jasper House,
who were accused of having hunted out the beaver
(HBCA B.56/a/6, May 25, 1837, Jan. 20, 1838).
By 1831, Fort Vennilion had moved downriver
to its current location, but the bison herds did not
recover. In the post records of the mid-1830s, it is
clear that moose was the main game animal in the
vicinity of the fort, although there are indications that
game, including bison, was more abundant in the
hinterland areas of the Hay and Loon4 Rivers (HBCA
B.224/a/4, Oct. 17, 1834, Mar. 25, 1835). By the
earl y 1840s, bison was no longer ranked as either first
or second in availability around the fort. In February,
1842, for instance, when moose was unusually scarce,
the only alternative discussed for provisioning Was
that of woodland caribou on the Caribou Mountains
(HBCA B.224/a/8, Feb. 23, 1842). The last journal
reference to the Fort Hunters hunting bison appeared
in January, 1842 (HBCA B.224/a/8, Jan. 13, 1842).
The Chief Traders at Fort Dunvegan continued
to comment on the difficulty with which provisions
were procured (HBCA B.39/b/5, MacIntosh to
Charles, Aug. 29, 1834; B.39/b/8, Campbell to Smith,
Apr. 30, 1837). The post records from the mid-1830s
on, although scanty, appear to indicate an increased
dependence on moose and "cabri."5 Campbell noted
in 1840 that since the large game had disappeared the
Fort Dunvegan Indians were forced to depend on
rabbits, and, with the rabbit cycle at a low point, the
people were expected to starve (HBCA B.39/b/11,
Campbell to Fisher, Oct. 9, 1840). Stories of starva-
tion continued into the 1840s (e.g., HBCAB.56/a/ll,
Apr.lO, 1843). By 1860, the Fort Chipewyan District
Report referred to the wild meat requirements of Fort
Dunvegan as being met through moose and black
bear. Bison were not mentioned at all (HBCA B.39/
e/10).
There were, however, observations from the
late 1800s of small bands of bison in the upper Peace
between Fort Dunvegan and Fort St. John (Ogilvie
1893: 39). It may be that bison never disappeared
entirely from the area until after that time, although
we should not dismiss the possibility that the upper
Peace was occasionally re-entered by migrant bands
of bison from the foothills.
The Salt Plains apparently continued abundant
in bison. In later years, Salt River settlement was
established on this hunting ground and served as a
source of provisions to the HBC. Over the decades,
hunting pressure from these provisioning activities
may have been partly responsible for a decrease of
bison. Disease may have also played a role. Accord-
ing to local tradition, bison were plentiful in the Salt
Plains area until the 1850s or 1860s, but many died
one summer due to disease. This mortality and others
noted for the area in the fur trade reports are docu-
mented in Ferguson and Laviolette (1992).
As noted above, Governor George Simpson had
recognized the scarcity of the game in the Peace-
Athabasca area by the early 1830s and on at least one
occasion ascribed this to the violence of the compe-
tition for that area. However, a new theme emerges
in the administrative reports about this time, that of
Native peoples killing large numbers of game during
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winters of heavy snowfall. Reports from both the
Mackenzie and the Plains noted that great numbers of
game animals had been run to exhaustion and killed
in extremely deep snows in the winter of 1830-1831.
Game scarcity in subsequent months in these areas
was attributed to these events (HBCA 0.4/125, Colin
Robertson, Fort Pelly, to Simpson, Feb. 13, 1831;
Edward Smith, Fort Simpson, to Chief Traders and
Factors, Nov. 28, 1830). The Fort Dunvegan post
journal recorded a similar incident in the winter of
1829-30. The trader, MacIntosh noted that this "wan-
ton" killing by the Fort Hunters provided more than
twice the number of bison actually required by the
post, but that since the animals were so lean, the meat
was oflittle use (PAA 74.1, box 4, item 120, Feb. 16,
1830).
Such an event could be interpreted in a number
of ways. It might represent a continuation of the
traditional practice of running down game in deep
snow, but at a time when game was sufficiently
reduced that the practice was maladaptive. It could
also have been an over-reaction to an easy harvest
after a number of years of scraping out "a miserable
livelyhood." There is also the possibility of a mercy
killing of starving animals. Finally, it could have
been a reaction to intrusion on their resources. Just a
few months previously, the local Beaver people and
freemen were "working the Beaver without incite-
ment and say for their reasons... that if they do not kill
it, the Iroquois etc. of Fort Assiniboine will be before
them" (PAA 74.1, box 4, item 120, Nov. 1,1829). A
similar rationale could have been applied to the bison
harvest.
The occurrence of such events appears to have
been discussed among the fur trade administrators
and gained some currency as an explanation for game
declines in the Canadian interior. At least, Maclean
attacked this reasoning in his 1849 memoirs (W.S.
Wallace 1968: 354). After asserting that the HBC
had never passed any regulations to conserve large
game, but instead had encouraged the collection of
provisions, he noted:
That the natives wantonly destroy the game in
years of deep snow is true enough; but the snow fell
to as great a depth before the advent of the whites
as after, and the Indians were as prone to slaughter
the animals then as now; yet game of every de-
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scription abounded and want was unknown. To
what cause then are we to ascribe the present
scarcity? There can be but one answer - to the
destruction of the animals which the prosecution
of the fur-trade involves.
In summary, while the records of this decade
1830-1840 document general agreement on the de-
pletion of bison in the Peace River area, the causes to
which this depletion are ascribed vary. Factors dis-
cussed in earlier decades are mentioned again, espe-
cially the pressure for provisions by the trade, exac-
erbated by strategies employed in the early competi-
tive period. By the end of the 1830s, however, anew
cause is proposed: the lack of good game manage-
ment practices by Aboriginal groups. Ironically, the
correspondence and reports of this decade parallel
aspects of the contemporary debate over wildlife
management.
Discussion
The data discussed above offer a new perspec-
tive on Raup' s (1933) reconstruction of wood bison
depletion. They inform the argument that historical
game depletions are evidence that Aboriginal people
could not manage their resources, by providing evi-
dence about a set of conditions under which one game
population was depleted. The following discussion
will consider these salient points.
Raup concluded that the decline in bison oc-
curred gradually between 1840 and 1860 and quite
rapidly thereafter. In contrast, these early fur trade
records make it clear that bison populations were in
marked decline before 1840. Given the observations
on game depletion in the first consistent records from
the early 1820s, we can suggest with some confi-
dence that the depletion began in the earlier period of
1800-1820.
Raup also concluded that the decline first af-
fected wood bison in peripheral areas and only later
in the core of their range, which he assumed was just
west of the Slave River. The fur trade journals and
correspondence indicate the opposite, that the initial
depletion occurred in the core area, which was lo-
cated in the region of the upper and central Peace
River.
The other buffalo hunting grounds in northern
Alberta, including the Peace-Athabasca Delta, were
subject to hunting pressures which were largely
dependent on their specific locations with respect to
fur trade posts. For the Peace-Athabasca Delta area,
the evidence for bison decline before 1840 is clear.
However, there is little definite evidence on the
relative state of the bison population in the hunting
grounds on the west side of the Slave River and in the
Clearwater River at this time.
Finally, Raup concluded that the bison near-
extinction was caused by increased snowfalls and by
overhunting consequent upon the introduction of the
rifle. In contrast, the long-time Peace-Athabasca
traders firmly placed the responsibility for game
depletion on the demands of the fur trade for provi-
sions. These demands were satisfied through the
introduction of immigrant specialist hunter-trappers
who serviced the trade, initially under contract and
then as "freemen." New technology was not the
cause.
The emphasis in these records on overhunting
as a cause of bison depletion does not constitute a
refutation of Raup's hypothesis concerning the role
of increasing snowfall. On the contrary, some of the
events mentioned above could be used to bolster such
a hypothesis. Other sources (e.g., Goddard 1916)
also repeat stories of deep snowfall causing heavy
mortality among the northern bison. John Maclean
may not have been entirely correct in his argument
that the snowfalls of the sort experienced in the 1830s
and 1840s were always common occurrences. The
final cold period of the "Little Ice Age" is usually
dated to the mid-1800s, and an increase in snowfall
may well have been a feature of this climatic oscilla-
tion. The pre-1840 records are too early to reflect a
trend of increasing snowfall. The post -1840 records
may be more useful in this respect. Presumably, the
balance among bison, snowfall, and Aboriginal hunt-
ing had survived earlier similar oscillations. That the
bison population barely survived the 1800s indicates
the operation of at least one additional factor. We
would have to conclude from the documentary record
that this factor was the fur trade's demands for provi-
sions.
The literature about common property resource
management is concerned with the conditions under
which communally-based institutions of resource
management succeed or fail. It highlights the need to
consider the context of any resource management
activities. Instances of overhunting are not proof that
no cultural value is placed on the sustainable use of
resources. The relationship between cultural value
and action is more complex. Particular social, eco-
nomic and ecological circumstances operating at any
one time can have a profound effect on which values
are selected for expression in specific adaptive strat-
egies (Stuchlik 1976: 7-45).
For instance, communities which practice ef-
fective resource management but which cannot repel
intruders may eventually decide to exhaust the re-
source themselves in order to realize a benefit. One
example may be the Beaver Indians and freemen,
who trapped beaver intensively possibly because of
repeated intrusions from the south. It does not follow
that the Beaver Indians no longer had respect for a
norm of sustainable use, nor does it follow that they
never had respect for such a norm. The social context
was simply not conducive to the expression of that
traditional value. This perspective can be applied as
well to the European fur-traders. Short-term adapta-
tion by fur traders to competitive circumstances can
be identified as one factor leading to resource deple-
tion. A broader analysis of socio-economic and
ecological conditions, although beyond the scope of
this paper, could be performed, perhaps in the vein of
Margolis' 1977 study of frontier cultivation.
With respect to defining such conditions, a
complicating factor in the Peace-Athabasca case is
the number of intruding groups. In the early period of
competition there were two and on occasion three
competing European fur trade companies in the Peace-
Athabasca area, as well as the specialist Iroquois/
Saulteaux group of trappers. In addition, the Lake
Athabasca-Iower Peace distribution of the Chipewyan
represented a shift south and west from their tradi-
tional territory. This shift began in the 1770s(Gillespie
1975: 374), and by 1830 there was a stable population
of Chipewyans in this area. The history of Cree
movement is more controversial, but certainly both
the Cree and Chipewyan had expanded into Beaver
territory and from time to time continued to impinge
on Beaver Indian lands. In subsequent years, the
trespassers came from the south and included Sas-
katchewan River and Fort Assiniboine peoples.
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Part of the significance of multiple alien groups
is that each one may have had different goals and
strategies of resource exploitation. The Fort
Assiniboine-Saskatchewan River intruders of the late
1820s-early 1830s, for instance, engaged in "raids"
on the resources of the upper Peace, perhaps as a
short-term alternative to resource exploitation in their
own country. The Plains Cree used the strategy of
burning the country as they passed through, in order
to drive away the large game, according to MacIntosh
(HBCA B.56/a/5, Oct. 24, 1836). The use of fire to
favor certain game species by altering the vegetation
appears to have been commonplace in northern Al-
berta (Ferguson 1979; Lewis 1982), but its use to
affect the subsistence of other groups adversely was
more characteristic of the Plains (Loscheider 1977).
The other groups cited above appear to have had
longer-term commitments to the area, but this did not
necessarily translate into actions which were consist-
ently conservationist in nature. The fur trading com-
panies presumably anticipated long term residence in
the country, a goal consistent with good resource
management, but since access to provisions was the
crucial point on which the initial contest rested, short-
term remedies to the competition problem involved
resource abuse. Similarly, the Chipewyan were de-
scribed as managing their own beaver resource well
but at the same time over-exploiting that of
neighboring lands (HBCA DA/93, Simpson to Com-
mittee, Mar. 1, 1829).
A second part of the significance of this multi-
plicity of trespassers has to do with the specific
relationships among the various intruders and local
groups. The ability or the inclination of the resident
peoples to repel invaders was important. From
Tumor's observations in 1792, we might conclude
that the Beaver Indians were fully committed at that
time to meeting the NWC's relatively low subsist~
ence needs. In view of this, the NWC decision to
bring in additional labor to deal with competitors
could reflect a number of different factors: First,
there may have been insufficient Beaver Indian hunt-
ers to provision and trap for an increased number of
NWC posts, possibly due to epidemic diseases (HBCA
BAI/a/2, Oct. 5, 1802). Second, the Beaver Indians
might have decided to play the competing companies
against each other rather than working solely for the
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NWC. Indeed, the Fort St. Mary journals comment
on La Flux, the trading chief, who divided his har-
vests between the NWC and the HBC so that they
would vie for his products and both would remain in
the country (Rich 1939: 113). Third, the NWC may
have recognized the benefit from introducing a com-
petitor for the Beaver Indian role of providing furs
and meat. Promoting competition among Fort Hunt-
ers of different ethno-cultural backgrounds was cer-
tainly a feature of post-1821 provisioning (HBCA
B.391a/22, Oct. 15, 1823). Finally, a transferoflabor
to the Peace-Athabasca region may have partly re-
solved issues of resource depletion and of relation-
ships with Aboriginal groups in eastern Canada.
Although there are references to hostilities be-
tween the Beaver and the Chipewyan (e.g.,HBCA
B.39/a/24, Feb. 10, 1826), there is no reference to
hostilities with the Iroquois, despite the latter's role
in depleting the resources of the upper Peace. Their
role as employees of the companies may have pro-
vided some protection. Yerbury (1986: 85) sug-
gested that such tensions may have been reduced by
Beaver-freemen intermarriage, which would have
served to equalize access to trade goods. This sug-
gestion is somewhat spoiled by his use of the example
of Baptiste Bisson and his sisters, who married mem-
bers of a Saulteaux family. Bisson is characterized by
Yerbury as a Beaver Indian chief, but he was a Metis
freeman (Rich 1938: 64, footnote). This particular
set of marriages is support for Nicks' (1979) observa-
tion that the freemen tended to marry among them-
selves. However, if we wanted to find a contrary
example, Bisson's brother, Bastonais would serve.
Some of his descendants are living today in the
Assumption-Fort Vermilion area as part of the Bea-
ver/Slave population (Ferguson n.d.).
The absence of hostilities between the Iroquois
and the Beaver may have been aided by the Iroquois'
final selection of territory. MacIntosh (HBCA B.391
b/5, MacIntosh to Charles, Oct. 22, 1833) com-
mented on their occupation of the upper Smoky
River, an area apparently not intensively used by the
Beaver but kept as a seed area. These foothills may
have served also as a buffer area between the Beaver
and other Aboriginal groups. Occupying intertribal
buffer zones rich in game resources would have been
a likely strategy for intrusive groups which intended
to settle. The Chipewyan occupation of the Hay
River, an area intermediate between Beaver and
Slave peoples, may have represented a similar phe-
nomenon.
A final point that may be significant is the role
played in this resource depletion by informational
lag. Simpson, despite extensive travel in the Peace-
Athabasca region, took almost eight years to arrive at
the same conclusion about resource depletion as the
local Peace River traders, that the Aboriginal groups
from the Fort Assiniboine and Saskatchewan River
were raiding an area that was already seriously de-
pleted. In part, this lag was a product of relative
abundance of resources. The Peace River probably
was resource-rich in comparison to other areas and
yielded a return which yet justified the effort. None-
theless, this continued exploitation was instrumental
in pushing the bison towards extinction.
In conclusion, then, this case study contributes
to a refutation of the way in which historical game
depletions have been depicted and used, as illustrated
in Macpherson (1981). Perhaps such a case study of
single big-game species can make its way more easily
across disciplinary boundaries into the wildlife man-
agement literature. Yet, given the recent initiatives in
co-management of northern wildlife resources, this
concern over the representation of historical game
depletion or management is almost passe. Certainly,
Macpherson (1986) appears to be advocating a re-
vised approach. Current negotiations do not overtly
depend on this line of argument - and rightly so,
because it is significant only if one assumes that what
people did or did not do in the distant past is directly
related to what their descendants can or cannot do in
the present - and this is palpably false.
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Notes
1. The wood bison were a northern bison population, repre-
sented as a distinct subspecies, Bison bison athabascae.
That designation is now questioned (Geist 1991). They
are commonly referred to as "buffalo."
The omission of the upper Peace in what is now British
Columbia is a direct result of the extreme paucity of early
post journals for that area.
But see Goddard (1916) for oral tradition concerning
communal techniques of bison hunting among the Beaver
people.
Now called Wabasca River.
The term "cabri" is generally used in the historical litera-
ture to refer to pronghorn antelope. It is a term which
appears in the Fort Dunvegan journals, but not in those
from Fort Vermilion. Banfield (1974: 402) does not
consider the historical distribution of the pronghorn to
extend to the Upper Peace. Either Banfield was mistaken
or the term was used by some people to refer to another
species, such as a deer.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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